Abstract. Grain [11] is a lightweight stream cipher submitted by M. Hell, T. Johansson, and W. Meier to the eSTREAM call for stream cipher proposals of the European project ECRYPT [5] . Its 160-bit internal state is divided into a LFSR and an NLFSR of length 80 bits each. A filtering boolean function is used to derive each keystream bit from the internal state. By combining linear approximations of the feedback function of the NLFSR and of the filtering function, it is possible to derive linear approximation equations involving the keystream and the LFSR initial state. We present a key recovery attack against Grain which requires 2 43 computations and 2 38 keystream bits to determine the 80-bit key.
Introduction
Stream ciphers are symmetric encryption algorithms based on the concept of pseudorandom keystream generator. In the typical case of a binary additive stream cipher, the key and an additional parameter named initialization vector (IV) are used to generate a binary sequence called keystream which is bitwise combined with the plaintext to provide the ciphertext. Although it seems rather difficult to construct a very fast and secure stream cipher, some efforts to achieve this have recently been deployed. The NESSIE project [24] launched in 1999 by the European Union did not succeed in selecting a secure enough stream cipher. Recently, the European Network of Excellence in Cryptology ECRYPT launched a call for stream cipher proposals named eSTREAM [5] . The candidate stream ciphers were submitted in May 2005. Those candidates are divided into software oriented and hardware oriented ciphers.
Hardware oriented stream ciphers are specially designed so that their implementation requires a very small number of gates. Such ciphers are useful in mobile systems, e.g. mobile phones or RFID, where minimizing the number of gates and power consumption is more important than very high speed.
One of the new hardware candidates submitted to eSTREAM is a stream cipher named Grain [11] which was developed by M. Hell, T. Johansson, and W. Meier 3 as an alternative to stream ciphers like GSM A5/1 or Bluetooth E 0 . It uses a 80-bit key and a 64-bit initialization vector to fill in an internal state of size 160 bits divided into a nonlinear feedback shift register (NLFSR) and a linear feedback shift register (LFSR) of length 80 bits each. At each clock pulse, one keystream bit is produced by selecting some bits of the LFSR and of the NLFSR and applying a boolean function. It is well known that LFSR sequences satisfy several statistical properties one would expect from a random sequence, but do not offer any security. Their combination with NLFSR sequences is expected to improve the security. However, NLFSR based constructions have not yet been as well studied as LFSR based constructions. The claimed security level of Grain is 2 80 , and it was conjectured by the authors of Grain that there exists no attack significantly faster than exhaustive search.
In this paper, we describe two key recovery attacks against Grain. The proposed attacks exploit linear approximations of the output function. The first one requires 2 55 operations, 2 49 bits of memory, and 2 51 keystream bits, and the second one requires 2
43
operations, 2 42 bits of memory, and 2 38 keystream bits. This paper is organized as follows. We first describe the Grain stream cipher (Section 2) and we derive some linear approximations involving the LFSR and the keystream (Section 3). We then present two techniques for recovering the initial state of the LFSR (Section 4). Finally, we present a technique allowing to recover the initial state of the NLFSR once we know the LFSR initial state (Section 5).
Description of Grain
Grain [11] is based upon three main building blocks: an 80-bit linear feedback shift register, an 80-bit nonlinear feedback shift register, and a nonlinear filtering function. Grain is initialized with the 80-bit key K and the 64-bit initialization value IV . The cipher output is an L-bit keystream sequence (z t ) t=0,...,L−1 .
The current LFSR content is denoted by Y t = (y t , y t+1 , . . . , y t+79 ). The LFSR is governed by the linear recurrence:
The current NFSR content is denoted by X t = (x t , x t+1 , . . . , x t+79 ). The NFSR feedback is disturbed by the output of the LFSR, so that the NFSR content is governed by the recurrence:
where the expression of nonlinear feedback function g is given by
The cipher output bit z t is derived from the current LFSR and NFSR states as the exclusive or of the masking bit x t and a nonlinear filtering function h as follows:
where p t and q t are the functions of y t+3 , y t+25 , y t+46 , y t+64 given by:
The boolean function h is correlation immune of the first order. As noticed in [11] , "this does not preclude that there are correlations of the output of h(x) to sums of inputs", but the designers of Grain appear to have expected the NFSR masking bit x t to make it impractical to exploit such correlations.
The key and IV setup consists of loading the key bits in the NFSR, loading the 64-bit IV followed by 16 ones in the LFSR, and clocking the cipher 160 times in a special mode where the output bit is fed back into the LFSR and the NFSR. Once the key and IV have been loaded, the keystream generation mode described above is activated and the keystream sequence (z t ) is produced.
Deriving Linear Approximations of the LFSR Bits

Linear Approximations Used to Derive the LFSR Bits
The purpose of the attack is, based on a keystream sequence (z t ) t=0...L−1 corresponding to an unknown key K and a known IV value, to recover the key K. The initial step of the attack is to derive a sufficient number N of linear approximation equations involving the n = 80 bits of the initial LFSR state Y 0 = (y 0 , . . . , y 79 ) (or equivalently a sufficient number N of linear approximation equations involving bits of the sequence (y t )) to recover the value of Y 0 . Hereafter, as will be shown in Section 5, the initial NFSR state X 0 and the key K can then be easily recovered.
The starting point for the attack consists in noticing that though the NFSR feedback function g is balanced, the function g given by g (X t ) = g(X t ) ⊕ x t is unbalanced. We have:
P r{g (X t ) = 1} = 522 1024 = 1 2 + g ,
. It is useful to notice that the restriction of g to input values X t such that x t+63 = 0 is totally balanced and that the imbalance of the function g is exclusively due to the imbalance of the restriction of g to input values X t such that x t+63 = 1.
If one considers one single output bit z t , the involvement of the masking bit x t in the expression of z t makes it impossible to write any useful approximate relation involving only the Y t bits. But if one considers the sum z t ⊕ z t+80 of two keystream bits output at a time interval equal to the NFSR length n = 80, the x t ⊕ x t+80 contribution of the corresponding masking bits is equal to g (X t ) ⊕ y t , and is therefore equal to y t with probability 1 2 + g . As for the other terms of z t ⊕ z t+80 , they can be approximated by linear functions of the bits of the sequence (y t ). In more details:
Since the restriction of g (X t ) to input values such that x t+63 = 0 is balanced, we can restrict our search to linear approximations of the term h(y t+3 , y t+25 , y t+46 , y t+64 , x t+63 ) to input values such that x t+63 = 1, which amounts to finding linear approximations of
We found a set of two best linear approximations for this function, namely:
Each of the approximations of L 1 is valid with a probability . Now the term h(y t+83 , y t+105 , y t+126 , y t+144 , x t+143 ) is equal to either p t+80 ⊕q t+80 or q t+80 , with a probability 1 2 for both expressions. We found a set of 8 best simultaneous linear approximations for these two expressions, namely:
Each of the 8 approximations of L 2 has an average probability 2 = 1 8 of being valid. Thus, we have found 16 linear approximations of z t ⊕ z t+80 , namely all the linear expressions of the form
where l 1 ∈ L 1 and l 2 ∈ L 2 . Each of these approximations is valid with a probability 1 2 + , where is derived from g , 1 , and 2 using the Piling-up Lemma:
The extra multiplicative factor of 1 2 takes into account the fact that the considered approximations are only valid when x t+63 = 1. The LFSR derivation attacks of Section 4 exploit these 16 linear approximations.
Generalisation of the Attack Method
In this Section, we try to generalise the previous approximation method. The purpose is not to find better approximations than those identified in Section 3.1, but to derive some design criteria on the boolean functions g and h . However in the previous approximation, we used the fact that the bias of g depends on the value of x t+63 , so that the approximations of g and h are not correct independently. We do not take this phenomenon into account in this Section. Therefore, we only provide a simplified picture of potential generalised attacks.
The function g(X t , Y t ) operates on w(g) = w L (g) + w N (g) variables taken from the LFSR and the NFSR, where w L (g) is the number of variables taken from the LFSR and w N (g) the number of variables taken from the NFSR. Let the function A g (X t , Y t ) be a linear approximation of the function g, i.e.
such that the distance between g(·) and A g (·) defined by:
is strictly larger than zero. Then, we have
where the bias is:
Similarly, the function h (X t , Y t ) can also be approximated by some linear expressions of the form:
Recall, z t p = A h (·) t with some probability p. Having the expressions (1) and (2), one can sum up together w N (A g (·)) expressions of A h (·) at different times t, in such a way that all terms X t will be eliminated (just because the terms X t will be cancelled due to the parity check function A g (·), leaving the terms Y t and noise variables only). Note also that any linear combination of A h (·) is a linear combination of the keystream bits z t .
The sum of w N (A g (·)) approximations A h (·) will introduce w N (A g (·)) independent noise variables due to the approximation at different time instances. Moreover, the cancellation of the terms X t in the sum will be done by the parity check property of the approximation A g (·). If the function A h (·) contains w N (A h ) terms from X t , then the parity cancellation expression A g (·) will be applied w N (A h ) times. Each application of the cancellation expression A g (·) will introduce another noise variable due to the approximation N g : g(·) → A g (·). Therefore, the application of the expression A g (·) w N (A h ) times will introduce w N (A h ) additional noise variables N g . Accumulating all above and following the Piling-up Lemma, the final correlation of such a sum (of the linear expression on Y t ) is given by the following Theorem.
Theorem 1. There always exists a linear relation in terms of bits from the state of the LFSR and the keystream, which have the bias:
where A g (·) and A h (·) are linear approximations of the functions g(·) and h (·), respectively, and:
This theorem gives us a criteria for a proper choice of the functions g(·) and h (·). The biases g and h are related to the nonlinearity of these boolean functions, and the values w N (A g ) and w N (A h ) are related to the correlation immunity property; however, there is a well-known trade-off between these two properties [27] . Unfortunately, in the case of Grain the functions g(·) and h (·) were improperly chosen.
Deriving the LFSR Initial State
In the former Section, we have shown how to derive an arbitrary number R of linear approximation equations in the n = 80 initial LFSR bits, of bias 2 −9.67 each, from a sufficient number of keystream bits. Let us denote these equations by:
In this Section we show how to use these relations to derive the initial LFSR state Y 0 . This can be seen as a decoding problem, up to the fact that the code length is not fixed in advance and one has to find an optimal trade-off between the complexities of deriving a codeword (i.e. collecting an appropriate number of linear approximation equations) and decoding this codeword.
An estimate of the number N of linear approximation equations needed for the right value of the unknown to maximize the indicator
or at least to be very likely to provide say one of the two or three highest values of I, can be determined as follows. Under the heuristic assumption that for the correct (resp. incorrect) value of Y 0 , I is the sum of N independent binary variables x i distributed according to the Bernoulli law of parameters p = P r{x i = 1} = 1 2 − and q = P r{x i = 0} = 1 2 + (resp. the Bernoulli law of parameters P r{x i = 1} = P r{x i = 0} =
0 is less than a suitably chosen false alarm probability p f a ; (ii) that the probability that I is lower than T for the correct value is less than a non detection probability p nd of say 1%. For practical values of p f a , the first condition is by far the most demanding. Setting the false alarm rate to p f a = 2 −n ensures that the number of false alarms is less than 1 in average.
Due to the Central Limit Theorem,
is distributed according to the normal law, so that:
can be approximated by
2 dt, where λ = 
It is easy to see that if we define:
then S is the Walsh transform of s . Therefore, the computational cost of the estimation of all the 2 m values of S using this method is 2 m−m1 N + m 1 · 2 m1 . If we compare this with the former basic Walsh transform method, we see that the required memory decreases from 2 m to 2 m1 , whereas the time complexity increases remains negligible as long as m 1 << log 2 (M ).
First LFSR Derivation Technique
In order to reduce the LFSR derivation complexity when compared with the naive method of complexity N · 2 n , we can exploit more keystream to produce more linear approximation equations in the unknowns y 0 to y n−1 , and retain only those equations involving the m < n variables y 0 to y m−1 , i.e. which coefficients in the n − m variables y m to y n−1 are equal to 0.
Thus a fraction of about 2 m−n of the relations are retained and we have to collect about N 2 n−m approximate relations to retain N relations. This requires a number of keystream bits of: N 2 n−m + 80
16 .
As seen in the former Section, once the relations have been filtered, the computational cost of the derivation of the values of these m variables using fast Walsh transform computations is about m2 m for the basic method, and more generally 2 m−m1 (N + m 1 2 m1 ) if fast Walsh transform computations are applied to a restricted set m 1 < m variables.
Thus, the overall time complexity of this method is:
and more generally:
Once the m variables y 0 to y m−1 have been recovered, one can either reiterate the same technique for other choices of the m unknown variables, which increases the complexity by a factor of less than 2 if m ≥ n 2 , or test each of the 2 n−m candidates in the next step of the attack (NFSR and key derivation).
An estimate of the number N of equations needed is given by
where λ is determined by the condition
2 dt = 2 −m . This condition ensures that the expected number of false alarm is less than 1.
The minimal complexity is obtained for m = 49. For this parameter value, we have λ = 7.87 and N = 2 24 . The attack complexity is about 2 55 , the number of keystream bits needed is around 2 51 , and the memory needed is about 2 49 .
Second LFSR Derivation Technique
An alternative method is to derive new linear approximation equations (of lower bias) involving m < n unknown variables y 0 to y m−1 by combining the R available approximate equations of bias pairwise, and retaining only those pairs of relations for which the n − m last coefficients collide. One obtains in this way about N = R 2 · 2 m−n−1 new affine equations in y 0 to y m−1 , of bias = 2 2 . The allocation of the m variables maximizing the number of satisfied equations can be found by fast Walsh computations as explained in the former Section.
The number N of relations needed is about The minimal complexity is obtained for m = 36. For this parameter value, we have λ = 6.65 and N = 2 41 . The attack complexity is about 2 43 , the number of keystream bits needed is about 2 38 and the memory required is about 2 42 .
Since functions p and q underlying h are balanced, each equation has the same occurrence probability. We are going to use the non linearity of the output function to recover the initial state of the NFSR by writing the equations corresponding to the first keystream bits.
The 16 first equations are linear equations involving only bits of the initial state of the NFSR because 63 + i is lower than 80.
To recover all the bits of the initial state, we introduce a technique which consists of building chains of keystream bits. The equations for keystream bits z 17 to z 79 involve either one bit of the LFSR (z i = x i or z i = x i ⊕ 1) or two bits (z i = x i ⊕ x 63+i or z i = x i ⊕x 63+i ⊕1). An equation involving only one bit allows us to instantly recover the value of the corresponding bit of the initial state. This can be considered as a chain of length 0. On the other hand, an equation involving two bits does not allow this because we do not know the value of x 63+i (for i > 16).
However, by considering not only the equations for z i but also all the equation for z k·63+i for k ≥ 1, we can cancel the bits we do not know and retrieve the value of x i . With probability 1 2 , the equation for z 63+i involves one single unknown bit. Then it provides the value of x 63+i and consequently the value of x i . Here the chain is of length 1, since we have to consider one extra equation to retrieve x i . The equation for z 63+i can also involve two bits with probability 1 2 . Then we have to consider the equation of z 2·63+i , which can also either involve only one bit (we have a chain of length 2) or two bits and we have to consider more equations to solve. Each equation has a probability 1 2 to involve 1 or 2 bits. Consequently the probability that a chain is of length n is 1 2 n+1 and the probability that a chain is of length strictly larger than n is 1 2 n+1 . We want to recover the values of x 17 , . . . , x 79 . We have to build 64 different chains. Let us consider L = 63 · n bits of keystream. The probability that one of the chains is of length larger than n is less than = 64 · 2 −n−1 and therefore less than 2 −n+5 . If we want this probability to be bounded by 2 −10 , then n > 15 and L > 945 suffices. Consequently a few thousands of keystream bits are required to retrieve the initial state of the NFSR and the complexity of the operation is bounded by 64 · n.
Since the internal state transition function associated to the special key and IV setup mode is one to one, the key can be efficiently derived from the NFSR and LFSR states at the beginning of the keystream generation by running this function backward.
Simulations and Results
To confirm that our cryptanalysis is correct, we ran several experiments. First we checked the bias of Section 3.1 by running the cipher with a known initial state of both the LFSR and the NLFSR, computing the linear approximations, and counting the number of fulfilled relations for a very large number of relations. For instance we found that one linear approximation is satisfied 19579367 times out of 39060639, which gives an experimental bias of 2 −9.63 , to be compared with the theoretical bias = 2 −9.67 . To check the two proposed LFSR reconstruction methods of Section 5, we considered a reduced version of Grain in order to reduce the memory and time required by the attack on a single computer: we shortened the LFSR by a factor of 2. We used an LFSR of size 40 with a primitive feedback polynomial and we reduced by two the distances for the tap entries of function h: we selected taps number 3, 14, 24, and 33, instead of 3, 25, 46, and 64 for Grain.
The complexity of the first technique for the actual Grain is 2 55 which is out of reach of a single PC. For our reduced version, the complexity given by the formula of Section 4.2 is only 2 35 . We exploited the 16 linear approximations to derive relations colliding on the first 11 bits. Consequently the table of the Walsh transform is only of size 2 29 . We used 15612260 2 23 relations, which corresponds to a false alarm probability of 2 −29 . Our implementation needed around one hour to recover the correct value of the LFSR internal state on a computer with a Intel Xeon processor running at 2.5 GHz with 3 GB of memory. The Walsh transform computation took only a few minutes.
For the actual Grain, the second technique requires only 2 43 operations which is achievable by a single PC. However it also requires 2 42 of memory which corresponds to 350 GB of memory. We do not have such an amount of memory but for the reduced version the required memory is only 2 29 . Since the complexity given by the formula of Section 4.3 is dominated by the required number of relations to detect the bias, our simulation has a complexity close to 2 43 . In practice, we obtained a result after 4 days of computation on the same computer as above and 2.5 · 10
12
2
41 relations where considered and allowed to recover the correct LFSR initial state.
Finally, we implemented the method of Section 5 to recover the NFSR. Given the correct initial state of the LFSR, and the first thousand keystream bits, our program recovers the initialization of the NFSR in a few seconds for a large number of different initializations of both the known LFSR and unknown NLFSR. We also confirmed the failure probability assessed in Section 5 for this method (which corresponds to the occurrence probability of at least one chain of length larger than 15).
Conclusion
We have presented a key-recovery attack against Grain which requires 2 43 computations, 2 42 bits of memory, and 2 38 keystream bits. This attack suggests that the following slight modifications of some of the Grain features might improve its strength:
-Introduce several additional masking variables from the NFSR in the keystream bit computation. -Replace the nonlinear feedback function g in such a way that the associated function g be balanced (e.g. replace g by a 2-resilient function). However this is not necessarily sufficient to thwart all similar attacks. -Modify the filtering function h in order to make it more difficult to approximate.
-Modify the function g and h to increase the number of inputs.
Following recent cryptanalysis of Grain including the key recovery attack reported here and distinguishing attacks based on the same kind of linear approximations as those presented in Section 3 [19] [26], the authors of Grain proposed a tweaked version of their algorithm [12] , where the functions g and h have been modified. This novel version of Grain appears to be much stronger and is immune against the statistical attacks presented in this paper.
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